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NOTES 
Statutes of Limitations and Opting Out of Class Actions 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides for class actions. 1 A 
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 states: 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued 
as representative parties on behalf of all only if (l) the class is so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 
of the class, and ( 4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class. 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the 
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(l) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class 
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individ-
ual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 
party opJ)osing the class, or 
(B) acljudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a 
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally appli-
cable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions oflaw or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action 
ts superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the 
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered 
in the management of a class action. 
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; Judgement; 
Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions. 
(l) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class 
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order 
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the 
decision on the merits. 
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the 
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including indi-
vidual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice 
shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so 
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all 
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclu-
sion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel. 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(l) or 
(b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the 
court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class 
action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and 
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, 
and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the 
class. 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action 
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each 
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and 
applied accordingly. 
{d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, 
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plaintiff2 brings a class action by filing a complaint on behalf of her-
self and a defined group similarly situated. "As soon as practicable 
after the commencement of an action brought as a class action,"3 the 
district judge must decide whether or not to "certify" the class, 
thereby allowing or disallowing the adjudication of the suit as a class 
action.4 A certification order must specify the particular type of class 
action approved by the court.5 One species of class action, permitted 
under rule 23(b)(3), requires that "the questions of law or fact com-
mon to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members."6 In these 23(b)(3) suits, the 
plaintiff notifies the class members of the action after certification.7 
the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or pre-
scribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evi-
dence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or 
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the 
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the pro-
posed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they 
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, 
or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties 
or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom 
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; 
(5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order 
under rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time. 
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised 
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise 
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 23. 
2. In a plaintiff's class action, the named class representative sues on behalf of the entire 
class. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a). The rule also provides that class members "may ... be sued 
as representative parties on behalf of all." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a). This Note is concerned only 
with plaintiff class actions; the problems of statutes of limitations and defendant class actions 
are outside its scope. 
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l). 
4. See notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text. The court may also alter or amend this 
order before the decision on the merits. See note 100 infra and accompanying text. 
5. The class action must fall within one of the three categories in rule 23(b). Rule 23(b)(l) 
allows class actions where separate actions could create the risk of either inconsistent adjudica-
tions imposing incompatible standards of conduct on a party, or adjudications which as a 
practical matter would determine the interests of other class members not parties to the action. 
See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(l) advisory committee note on 1966 amendment, reprinted in 39 
F.R.D. 69, 100-01 (1966). Subdivision (b)(2) encompasses actions where injunctive relief, ap-
plicable to the class as a whole, is the appropriate, final relief. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(2) advi-
sory committee note on 1966 amendment, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966). For a 
discussion of actions certified under 23(b)(3), see notes 6-9 infra and accompanying text. 
6. In the spurious action, the suit did not adjudicate the rights of anyone not a party to the 
action. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on the 1966 amendments, reprinted in 
39 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966). For a discussion of the abuses of the spurious action, see note 128 
infra. 
7. Rule 23(c)(2) states that "the court shall direct to the members of the class the best 
notice practicable." In Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-79 (1974), the Supreme 
Court stated that the plaintiff must bear the cost of such notice. See also 3B J. MOORE & J. 
KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 23.55, at 23-453 (2d ed. 1982); Frankel, Some Pre-
liminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D 39, 40-41 (1967). For a discussion of 
what constitutes the "best notice practicable" under the rule, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 
417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1974). 
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The notice informs the class members of their right to "opl"•out" of 
the suit. Opting out excludes the individual from the class suit. 8 
Failure to opt out subjects the individual to the binding effect of a 
judgment in the class action.9 
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 10 the Supreme 
Court considered the relationship between class action procedure 
and the principles underlying statutes of limitations. The Court held 
that the filing of a class action tolls11 the statute of limitations for 
putative class members who attempt to intervene in the original ac-
tion after the denial of class certification. 12 Despite the narrow scope 
of this holding, the broad reasoning13 and language14 of the opinion 
8. Subdivision (c)(2) states that the notice must advise each class member that "the court 
will exclude him from the class ifhe so requests by a specified date." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(2). 
Opting out is limited to class actions certified under subdivision (b)(3). In the other two 
categories of rule 23 actions, the final judgment will decide the rights of all members of the 
class. Even if they could opt out, the class members would not be able to avoid the effects of 
the judgment. An injunction issued in a (b)(2) action, for example, would enjoin all illegal 
action. Class members would necessarily be affected by such broad relief. 
Courts have the discretionary power under subdivision (d) to extend the opt-out rule to 
(b)(l) and (b)(2) suits, but have declined to do so. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Weinberger, 66 F.R.D. 
601,604 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295,300 (E.D. La. 1970). 
One commentator has asserted that where courts wish to allow absentees to exclude themselves 
from the injunctive relief, the court will define the suit as a (b)(3) suit. See .Developments in the 
Law- Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1485 n.169 (1976). 
9. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(3). 
10. 414 U.S. 538 (1974). lnAmerican Pipe, the class action was filed eleven days before the 
running of the statute of limitations. Class certification was then denied because the class 
members were not so numerous as to make joinder in a regular action impracticable. Upon 
denial, class members attempted to intervene in the sole remaining action, that of the would-be 
class representative. 414 U.S. at 541-44. 
l l. For the purposes of this discussion, "tolled" means "suspended." See generally, Spe-
cial Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State 
Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 101 l, 1084-85 (1980); Comment, Class Actions 
and Statutes of Limitations, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 106, 115 (1981). The time during which a 
statute is tolled does not count in determining the limitations period. 
12. The Court held: 
[A]t least where class action status has been denied solely because of failure to demon-
strate that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable," the 
commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported 
members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the 
suit inappropriate for class action status. 
414 U.S. 552-53 (quoting FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(l)). 
13. The Court stated that where the class suit met the typicality and adequacy of represen-
tation requirements of rule 23(a): 
the claimed members of the class stood as parties to the suit until and unless they received 
notice thereof and chose not to continue. Thus, the commencement of the action satisfied 
the purpose of the limitation provision as to all those who might subsequently participate 
in the suit as well as for the named plaintiffs. To hold to the contrary would frustrate the 
principal function of a class suit, because then the sole means by which members of the 
class could assure their participation in the judgment if notice of the class suit did not 
reach them until after the running of the limitation period would be to file earlier individ-
ual motions to join or intervene as parties - precisely the multiplicity of activity which 
rule 23 was designed to avoid in those cases where a class action is found "superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Rule 
23(b)(3). 
414 U.S. at 550-51. 
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have confused the lower courts. 15 The Court's subsequent reasser-
tion, in dicta, that American Pipe "established that commencement 
of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all 
members of the class"16 compounded this confusion. One of the is-
sues engendered by this uncertain Supreme Court guidance17 is 
whether one who opts out of a certified class and then brings a sepa-
14. The opinion, !hough limiting !he holding to the facts of the case, expressly applies to 
"all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene." 414 U.S. at 553 
(emphasis added). 
IS. The Court stressed that the statute is tolled where certification is denied "solely" be-
cause oflack of numerosity. Courts have discussed whether other reasons for denying certifica-
tion will also result in tolling. See, e.g., Sanders v. Faraday Laboratories, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 99, 
103 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (toll even though !he class lacks adequate representation because the 
representative failed to prosecute !he class claim vigorously); Miller v. Central Chinchilla 
Group, Inc., 66 F.R.D 41 I, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (toll even though common questions did not 
predominate); Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp. Silver Spring, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 586, 590 (D. Md. 1974) 
(toll even !hough class too amorphous). 
The broad reasoning has also caused differing opinions over whether a restrictive or an 
expansive reading of American Pipe should be applied. Compare qiuck v. Amicor Inc., 487 F, 
Supp. 608,615 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Second Circuit applies American Pipe only as far as its facts), 
with Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760-61 (3d Cir. 1974) (en bane) (American 
Pipe eliminates statute oflimitations problems), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). Some courts 
do not decide the issue. See Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 178 (5th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 425. U.S. 912 (1976). 
Many courts refer to American Pipe in dicta or make unsupported statements about its 
holding or bolh. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1074 n.28 (7th Cir, 
1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 425 U.S. 929 (1976); Parker v. Bell Helicopter 
Co., 78 F.R.D. 507, 513 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 419 F. Supp, 
1116, 1121 n.19 (D. Hawaii 1976); Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394, 
396 (D. Md. 1974), ajfd., 520 F.2d 871 (41h Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975). 
16. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 n.13 (1974) (emphasis added). In this 
case, !he plaintiff argued that individual notice was not always required under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(c)(2). See note 7 supra and accompanying text. The plaintiff argued that, 
among other reasons, notice was not required because class members would not opt out. Mem-
bers would "not opt out because the statute of limitations has long since run out on the claims 
of all class members." 417 U.S. at 176 n.13. The Court then stated the dicta quoted in text. 
Some courts have found this dicta "highly persuasive." McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic 
Transmissions, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 61,359, at 71,266 (E.D. Mich. 1977); see 
Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1982) (Norris, J., dissenting) ("The Supreme 
Court could not have spoken more clearly."); Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437, 448 
n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Other courts have been "not so persuaded," Wachovia Bank & Trust v. 
National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1012 (D.D.C.), revd. on other grounds, 
650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981), or found the language "puz-
zling." Stull v. Bayard, 424 F. Supp. 937, 943 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Several courts have noted that these dicta seem extremely broad, but have declined to express 
any opinion on it. See Wood v. Combustion Engr., Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 346 nn.21 & 22 (5th Cir. 
1981); Brame v. Ray Bills Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568,585 n.17 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). Finally, other 
courts concerned wilh class action tolling questions have not cited !he Eisen footnote at all. 
See Ameil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977); Gluck v. Amicor Inc., 487 F. Supp. 608 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Co., 485 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Ala. 1980). 
17. In Parker v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 677 F.2d 391 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct, 
338 (1982) (No. 82-118), !he Fourth Circuit tolled !he statute where class certification was 
denied and the plaintiff subsequently filed a separate suit. Though not the same issue debated 
in this Note, where class certification is granted and the plaintiff opts out, the Parker problem 
has split !he circuits. See Ameil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 782-83 (2d Cir. 1977) (American 
Pipe only mandates tolling after certification denial where class members intervene in the orig-
inal action, not where !hey attempt to file separate actions). The Court decision in Parker 
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rate suit should benefit from the tolling of the statute for the dura-
tion of her membership in the class. 18 The lower courts have differed 
on the answer to this question. 19 
This Note argues that one who opts out of a class action should 
should shed light on how broadly American Pipe and the subsequent Eisen dicta are to be 
construed. See generally notes 15-16 supra and note 19 infra. 
The Court has also granted certiorari to resolve a more distantly related American Pipe 
problem. In Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, sub nom. Chardon v. 
Soto, 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982) (No. 82-271), the Court of Appeals started the statute oflimitations 
running anew after denial of class certification. This result, reached through an application of 
Puerto Rican law,see 681 F.2d at 49-50, contrasts withAmerican Pipe. InAmerican Pipe, the 
Court held the statute of limitations resumed running on the federal antitrust claim upon de-
nial of certification. 414 U.S. at 560-61. 
18. After the plaintiff opts out of the class action, he or she is not entitled to any additional 
tolling that may accrue to class members. Opting out severs the plaintiff's relationship with the 
class - the only reason that tolling might be allowed. When the reason for tolling ends, the 
statute starts to run again. See, e.g., Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Co., 485 F. Supp. 356,361 (N.D. 
Ala. 1980) (even if tolling was allowed, the statute had run), affd., 648 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Thus, whether the statute is tolled for the time the plaintiff was in the class becomes very 
important. Unless the statute was tolled while she was a class member, her action will be time 
barred. One example of a situation where this question has been important is the following: A 
class action is filed but several large plaintiffs opt out. If the defendant decides to settle the 
suit, a big factor in his or her willingness to negotiate and settle is whether the people who 
opted out can later bring another action. 
19. TheAmerican Pipe Court sought to preserve the efficiency of the class action device. It 
reasoned !}lat if courts do not toll after the denial of class certification, putative class members 
would file suits before the certification decision to protect themselves. American Pipe, 414 
U.S. at 553; see note 13 supra; notes 34-35 infra and accompanying text. 
One court favored a flat no-tolling rule as most consistent with the American Pipe case. 
The court did not discuss the Eisen dicta. Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Co., 485 F. Supp. 356, 360-
6 I (N.D. Ala. 1980) (holding plaintiff time-barred even if tolling allowed), affd, 648 F.2d 337 
(5th Cir. 1981). Other courts have found Eisen controlling. Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 
419 F. Supp. 1116, 1191 n.19 (D. Hawaii 1976) (dicta; would toll even though class not certi-
fied); Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437,448 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dicta). In McAlpine 
v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. ~ 61,359 (E.D. Mich. 1977), the 
court tolled the statute for those who filed their own suits before the time for opting out ends. 
In this case, the defendant was engaged in a continuing wrong. Tolling just extended the pe-
riod for which plaintiffs could seek recompense. In Wood v. Combustion Engr., Inc., 643 F.2d 
339, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1981), the court adopted a unique solution. The court noted simply that 
tolling is an equitable doctrine. Since the plaintiffs had waited nineteen months after opting 
out to file their suit, equity would not excuse their delay. 
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1010-
13 (D.D.C. 1978), rerd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 
954 (1981), the plaintiffs filed their suit before the class was certified. The court felt they had 
"been manipulating the tolling doctrine" since they evidently never relied on or considered 
joining the class action suit. The court might have tolled if "following certification, they had 
determined that the class action strategy would not protect their rights and had then promptly 
filed a separate action .... " 461 F. Supp. at 1012. 
Other courts faced with related tolling questions have also tried to advance these policies. 
See, e.g., Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (class certification denied; would only 
toll for those who intervened in the original action, not for those who filed separate suits after 
the denial; refused to follow Eisen dicta); Arneil v. ,Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 782-83 (2d Cir. 
1977) (class certification denied; would only toll for intervenors in original action; Eisen not 
discussed); Gluck v. Amicor Inc., 487 F. Supp. 608, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (only toll for interven-
ors; Eisen not discussed). Other courts have tolled where the class members filed separate suits 
instead of intervening. See Parker v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 677 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1982) 
(class certification denied), cert. granted, sub nom. Chardon v. Soto, 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982) (No. 
82-118); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1074 n.28 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and 
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not benefit from tolling for the time during which the individual was 
a class member. Part I develops an analytical framework, grounded 
in the underlying policies of statutes of limitations and applied in 
recent Supreme Court decisions, for resolving tolling questions. This 
Part concludes that a plaintiff must show that tolling will not conflict 
with the policy purposes animating statutes of limitations, as well as 
a policy reason that favors tolling. Part II applies the first of these 
parameters to the opt-out situation, and concludes that tolling typi-
cally would not offend the policy concerns behind statutes of limita-
tions. Part III examines the consequences of tolling for the interests 
served by the class action procedure. Given the weight accorded to 
these competing interests by American Pipe and its progeny, the pol-
icy balance shifts convincingly against tolling the limitations period 
for those who opt out of the class action. Courts confronting this 
issue should accordingly honor the reasoning of American Pipe 
rather than dicta suggesting a rule broader than its rationale. 
l. THE DOCTRINE OF TOLLING 
The case of a plaintiff who opts out of a certified class action and 
files an individual complaint following the passage of the original 
limitations period does not involve the traditional disability excep-
tions20 to the time bar provided for in the statute itself21 or created 
remanded on other grounds, 425 U.S. 929 (1976); Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507, 
513 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1978). 
20. The normal tolling situation is where the plaintiff did not bring suit in time because of 
a disability beyond her control. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428-29 
(1965) (tolling allowed in cases where "plaintiff has not slept on his rights, but, rather has been 
prevented from asserting them"); Inada v. Sullivan, 523 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff 
alleged sham investigation by police but this did not change his right to sue and it was not 
sufficient justification for tolling); Jolivet v. Elkins, 386 F. Supp. 261,272 (D. Md. 1974) (stat-
ute not "tolled in the absence of some insuperable barrier to the bringing of the action"); Hall 
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp. 358,360 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (tolling is allowed 
when the plaintiff was prevented from getting relief by circumstances beyond his or her con-
trol); Vernon, The l/n!form Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems, 12 
VAND. L. REV. 971, 982 (1959) (extension allowed when delay in bringing suit is beyond 
plaintiffs control); Special Project, supra note 11, at 1084 (toll if circumstances beyond plain-
tiffs control prevented suit); J)evelopments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. 
REV. 1177, 1220 (1950) (toll when plaintiff is hindered or prevented from bringing suit because 
of disability or conduct of defendant; burden of proving applicability of tolling is on plaintill); 
Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1144 n.111 (1979) (toll• 
ing prevents running of statute of limitations when plaintiffs delay is justifiable), q. Kenney 
v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1965) (after statutory period has run, libellant 
has burden of proving that the delay has not prejudiced the respondent and that there is a good 
excuse to justify invocation of the doctrine of tolling), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966); Mc-
Mahon v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 297 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1962) (same). Where, for 
example, the defendant fraudulently conceals the cause of action from the plaintiff, or induces 
her to wait beyond the statutory period, courts will toll the statute of limitations. See, e.g., 
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 
1119 (7th Cir. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Dunlnp v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 478 F. Supp. 610, 611 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Similarly where the plaintiffs delay was the 
result of infancy, insanity or death, tolling is allowed. See, e.g., Head, •. Children's Hosp., 407 
Mich. 388, 285 N.W.2d 203 (1979) (infancy); Geisland v. Csutoroas, 78 Mich. App. 624, 261 
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by courts of equity.22 Rather, the correct application of the statute of 
limitations in this situation turns on whether the timely commence-
ment of a related legal proceeding (the class action) suspends the 
expiration of the limitations period so as to permit the individual's 
action. While the law has long required the plaintiff seeking relief 
from the time bar to bear the burden of proving that it should be 
lifted,23 the showing sufficient to carry this burden has eluded rigor-
N.W.2d 537 (1977) (insanity); Schneider v. Fox, 73 Mich. App. 595, 252 N.W.2d 530 (1977) 
(death of plaintifi). Other disabilities justifying tolling are when war causes "internment 
abroad, see, e.g., Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1947), and incarceration, 
see, e.g., Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968). In Burnett v. New York Cent. 
R.R., 380 U.S 424 (1965), the statute was tolled when the plaintiffs original state claim was 
dismissed for improper venue and the state did not have a transfer of action procedure. In all 
of these situations, the plaintiff can demonstrate that a disability beyond her control caused the 
delay. The plaintiff asserts as an affirmative reason for tolling that she, through no fault of her 
own, was prevented from vindicating her rights. If tolling is denied, infants, the insane, and 
those fraudulently deceived will almost always be left without a remedy. 
21. Many statutes of limitations explicitly provide for suspension of the statute for the 
traditional disabilities. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 600.5852-.5855 (1979) (death, absence 
from the state, war, and fraudulent concealment suspend the statute); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 600.5851 (1979) (infancy, insanity, and imprisonment). For cases discussing statutory tolling, 
see, e.g., Echols v. Chrysler Corp., 633 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1980) (fraudulent concealment); 
Lemson v. General Motors Corp., 66 Mich. App. 94, 238 N.W.2d 414 (1975) (fraudulent 
concealment). 
22. Historically, courts of equity would often offer a forum to a plaintiff whose action at 
law was barred by the statute, provided that the balance of equities justified the failure to bring 
the action at law within the statutory period. See 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 1521, 
at 848 (13th ed. 1886) ("Courts of Equity not only act in obedience and in analogy to the 
Statutes of Limitations in proper cases, but they also interfere in many cases to prevent the bar 
of the statutes where it would be inequitable or unjust."). The classic example of "equitable 
tolling" is the exception for fraudulent concealment, which originated in equity before it began 
to appear in the statutes. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). But courts have relied 
on the authority inherited from the chancellor to justify tolling in other contexts. See Wood v. 
Combustion Engr., 643 F.2d 339, 347 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Equity, therefore, may frequently come 
to the rescue of a plaintiff who, for one reason or another, has been prevented from timely 
filing suit.") (court declined to toll). Modem courts, however, have become quite restrained in 
their approach to creating exceptions to the limitations bar. See note 42 i,!fra. 
Viewing the tolling doctrine as a creature of equity is perfectly consistent with the policy-
oriented approach taken by recent Supreme Court decisions and relied upon by this Note. 
"Balancing competing policies" and "weighing the equities" are essentially identical, outcome-
oriented approaches to legal analysis. This is especially so in this context, where plaintifl's 
claim for relief must be weighed against the maxim "Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas 
subvenit," "equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights." 2 J. POMEROY, 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 418, at 169 (5th ed. 1941). 
23. It is well settled that the plaintiff, to overcome the status quo, has the burden of justify-
ing tolling. E.g., Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (party claiming excep-
tion to the statute oflimitations has the burden of showing it), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); 
Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff has burden of proving 
facts necessary to toll); Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157, 1162 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(burden on plaintiff to prove statute tolled when suit filed after the limitations period); NLRB 
v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 383 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940 
(1979) (party seeking to avoid statute oflimitations has burden of proof and all presumptions 
are against him or her); De Witt v. United States, 593 F.2d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 1979) (party 
claiming exception to statute of limitations must prove it); see also lnada v. Sullivan, 523 F.2d 
485, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1975) (discussing plaintifl's failure to show a proper basis for equitable 
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ous definition.24 
Essentially, the issue depends on "a value judgment concerning 
the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are 
outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale 
ones."25 This judgment in tum requires balancing the policy inter-
ests protected by statutes of limitations against the policy interests 
furthered by tolling in a particular case, 26 and the Supreme Court 
has adopted his analysis in recent decisions. 27 
tolling); Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1965), (libelant has burden of 
justifying tolling) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966). 
Deciding the content of the plaintiff's burden is important for two reasons. First, the plain-
tiff must know what must be proved and what evidence must be presented. Second, the judge 
needs a standard against which to measure the evidence to see if the plaintiff has proved the 
necessity of tolling; he or she must be able to decide when tolling is proper. 
24. No comprehensive paradigm for analyzing limitations issues has emerged either from 
the decided cases or legal commentary. See J)evelopments in the Law: Statutes of Limitatio11s, 
supra note 20, at 1178 (no comprehensive study since Wood's last edition in 1916). Commen-
tary and decisions have tended to focus on particular problems, and the resulting jurispru-
dence has a somewhat ad hoc character. 
American Pipe presents a typical analysis. After discussing the facts and procedural pos-
ture of the case, the Court plunged into the history of the rule 23 class action device. 414 U.S. 
at 545-50. Upon reaching the modern version of the rule, the Court quickly came to the con-
clusion that by fulfilling the time bar policies, the filing of a class action suit satisfied the 
limitations statute for class members. 414 U.S. at 550-51. The Court then discussed how the 
denial of class certification affected this result, holding that a limited tolling rule was appropri-
ate. 414 U.S. at 552-56; see note 12 supra and accompanying text. In this discussion, the 
functional purposes of time bars were considered at somewhat more length than before. 414 
U.S. at 554-55. At the end of this analysis, the Court concluded that "the tolling rule we 
establish here is consistent both with the procedures of rule 23 and with the proper function of 
the limitations statute." 414 U.S. at 555. At no time earlier in the decision did the Court 
explain that this consistency was either desirable or required. 
25. Board of Regents of the Univ. ofN.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,485 (1980) (quoting 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975)). 
26. The disability exceptions may be viewed as weighing the policy interests protected by 
plaintifl's substantive cause of action against the policy interests protected by statutes of limita-
tions. Where a plaintiff is prevented from asserting a cause of action, enforcing the time bar 
would completely sacrifice the interests protected by that cause of action. Conversely, where 
the plaintiff has negligently forgone a cause of action, she has, in effect, waived her interest in 
enforcing it after the passage of the limitations period. Thus in Burnett v. New York Cent. 
R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), the Court noted that the "policy of repose, designed to protect 
defendants, is frequently outweighed, however, where the interests of justice require vindica-
tion of the plaintiff's rights." 380 U.S. at 428. The Court found that where a railroad worker 
had brought an FELA action in a state court which was dismissed after the expiration of the 
limitations period for improper venue, and the state had no transfer statute, the filing of the 
original action tolled the limitations period. The Court expressly reasoned by analogy to the 
disability exceptions, concluding that in "such cases a plaintiff has not slept on his rights but, 
rather, has been prevented from asserting them." 380 U.S. at 429. Thus the need to ''vindi-
cat[e] the plaintifl's rights" "outweighed" the "policy of repose." By contrast, where disability 
does not explain the plaintiff's inaction, the policies behind her cause of action cannot weigh in 
favor of tolling, for the limitations period itself embodies the judgment that after a fixed period 
the repose interest outweighs the interests served by the cause of action. 
27. See Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980); 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975); American Pipe & Constr. 
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974). One Supreme Court case arguably does not require 
any affirmative policy reason to support tolling. In United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 
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This policy calculus can assume several forms.28 In the class ac-
tion context, some courts appear willing to allow tolling whenever 
this would not offend the policies behind statutes of limitations.29 
Others appear to require satisfaction of the time bar policies and an 
additional affirmative justification for tolling.30 In the light ofAmeri-
U.S. 385 (1977), the Court considered how "timely" a motion for intervention had to be for the 
purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. 
A United Airlines stewardess had filed a sex discrimination charge, first with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, then in a federal district court. The court suit was 
filed as a class action. The court denied certification of the class, but permitted additional 
stewardesses to intervene. The court also certified for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) its denial of class certification. The Seventh Circuit refused to accept the appeal. 
Eventually the original plaintiff and intervenors settled with the defendant, and hence, did not 
make an appeal of right of the class certification denial. 432 U.S. at 387-89. 
The plaintiff in McDonald, a former stewardess, attempted to intervene after the entry of 
judgment. She sought intervention for the sole purpose of appealing the denial of class certifi-
cation. 432 U.S. at 390. 
As the McDonald dissent points out, her individual claim was barred at this point. Under 
the American Pipe Rule, the statute of limitations started running after denial of class certifica-
tion, and the statute had long since run. 432 U.S. at 397-98 (Powell, J., dissenting). The court, 
however, considered her intervention "timely" for the purpose of the class denial appeal. 
This result could be explained by mere satisfaction of the time bar policies. 432 U.S. at 
394. The Court gives no additional, independant policy rationale for its decision. A rationale, 
however, is buried in the footnotes. The Court noted that, in the Seventh Circuit, a class 
action certification decision was not appealable as of right until after entry of the final judg-
ment. 432 U.S. at 388 n.4. Defendants, after denial of class certification, would have a strong 
incentive to settle with the original plaintiffs. By settling, they would avoid any appeal of the 
class certification decision. If intervention by unrepresented class members were not allowed 
after settlement, the certification decision would never be appealed. The unrepresented class 
members, presumably many with claims too small to justify an individual action, would never 
have a chance to contest the order. Thus, the McDonald case can be read as an attempt to 
avoid the worst aspects of the Seventh Circuit's Rule. It is noteworthy, in this respect, that the 
Court later adopted the same rule: plaintiffs cannot appeal as of right from a denial of class 
certification before entry of a final judgment. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 
(1978). The Court later expressed a serious and well-founded concern for protecting the ap-
peal of orders denying certification against the risk' of settlement with the named representa-
tives. See Deposit Guar. Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("A district court's 
ruling on the certification issue is often the most significant decision rendered in these class-
action proceedings. To deny the right to appeal simply because the defendant has sought to 
'buy off the individual private claims of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound 
judicial administration.") (footnote omitted). 
28. The courts have not developed any rigorous theoretical approach to limitations ques-
tions. Thus the standards discussed here describe the assumptions and resl!lts of courts taking 
various approaches, but cannot be said to reflect any deliberate doctrinal differences. 
29. A few cases in other class action tolling situations have examined limitations policies. 
See McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 562 F.2d 1269, 1273-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Haas v. Pittsburgh 
Natl. Bank, 526 F.2d 1083, 1097 n.19 (3d Cir. 1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 
696-97 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
30. See Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
1030 ( 1966) ("After the statutory period has run the libellant has the burden of proving that 
the delay has not prejudiced the respondent and that there is a good excuse to justify invoca-
tion of the doctrine.") (emphasis added); McMahon v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 297 F.2d 
268, 270 (5th Cir. 1962) (libellant must show lack of prejudice and an excuse for the delay); 
Comment, supra note 11, at 110-15 {policies behind statutes of limitations must be satisfied, 
and the risk of American Pipe "multiplicity" problem must also be shown). For a case where 
the court found a direct conflict between the statute of limitations policies and the class ac- . 
tion's policies, but still allowed tolling, see Appleton Elec. Co., v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 
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can Pipe, some commentary has focused exclusively on the class ac-
tion policies reflected in rule 23.31 
This Note argues that the appropriate standard requires the 
plaintiff to establish that a tolling rule would not off end limitations 
policies, and that an affirmative policy reason supports tolling the 
statute. Mere satisfaction of the time b~r policies will not suffice, 
because absent disability the policy interests underlying the cause of 
action itself do not weigh in favor of tolling.32 Given that the statu-
tory bar presumptively applies after the expiration of the limitations 
period, and that every tolling decision does at least marginal damage 
to the policy interest in repose, the plaintiff cannot establish a 
favorable policy balance without some independent justification.33 
Sound theoretical considerations support this analytical framework, 
and recent Supreme Court cases have consistently applied it. 
In American Pipe, for example, the Court upheld tolling where 
suspending the time bar would not off end the policy interests pro-
tected by the statute of limitations and would significantly advance 
F.2d 603, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981). See also International 
Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 708 (1966) (tolling necessary to imple-
ment national policy of uniform time bars for Federal Employers' Liability Act action); Gon-
zalez v. Santiago, 550 F.2d 687, 688 (1st Cir. 1977) ("[N]o overriding federal interest impels 
us to toll the applicable statute of limitations in this case."); Jolivet v. Elkins, 386 F. Supp. 
261,272 (D. Md. 1974) (statute not tolled in the absence of clearly established authority); Note, 
Class Actions- Tolling of Statutes of Limitations-Adequate Representation - Haas v. Pitts-
burgh Natl. Bank, 17 B.C. INous. & COM. L. REV. 915,917 (1976) {only toll statutes oflimita• 
tions when a strong policy requires it); cf. Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947) 
(statutes of limitations must be strictly adhered to by the judiciary). Where tolling would 
violate the policies beh4td statutes of limitations, the policy reason would presumably have to 
be stronger. 
A line of cases implicitly relying on the absence of an affirmative justification for tolling 
denies a plaintiff the benefit of tolling for the period of the pendency of an action dismissed 
without prejudice and then refiled after the expiration of the limitations period. See Wheeler, 
Predismissal Notice and Statutes of Limitations in Federal Class Actions After American Pipe 
and Construction Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CAL. L. REV 771, 775 (1975) (filing a law suit that is later 
dismissed does not toll the statute of limitations for a subsequent action by the same persons 
on the same cause of action). Cf. .Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 
20, at 1239 (would not allow amendment to the claim adding a new plaintiff after the statute of 
limitations has run even if the defendant knew about the claim within the statutory period 
because of suit brought by a joint plaintifl). Although these cases do not say that a strong 
policy reason is necessary to toll the statute, these decisions are inconsistent with an analysis 
focusing solely on policies behind statutes of limitations, since those policies were satisfied by 
bringing the first suit. q. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974) 
(policies behind statutes of limitations satisfied when representative of class brings suit; de-
fendants notified of the essential information about the cause of action). 
31. See Note, The American Pipe .Dream: Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations, 67 
IOWA L. REV. 743, 752-58 (1982) (analysis of opt-out situation focusing solely on class action 
policies); Comment, supra note 11, at 110-11 (any American Pipe analysis must also consider 
the policies of tolling and statutes of limitations). 
32. The judgment implicit in the statute is that after the limitations period expires the 
defendant's interest in repose outweighs the plaintiff's interest in an adjudication on the merits; 
in effect the plaintiff has waived her cause of action by sleeping on her rights. See note 26 
supra. 
33. See notes 42-44 in.fro and accompanying text. 
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the policy purposes of rule 23 class actions. Since the original class 
action notified the defendant of the need to litigate, enforcing the 
time bar would not have advanced the interests protected by the stat-
ute of limitations.34 Moreover, a decision not to toll the statute of 
limitations would result in the filing of duplicative protective mo-
tions lest a subsequent denial of certification leave class members 
without a remedy.35 Given no reason not to toll, and a strong policy 
interest favoring tolling, the Court held that the lapse of the original 
limitations period did not bar intervention following the denial of 
class status. 
A similar analysis produced an opposite result in Johnson v. Rail-
way Express Agency.36 There the Court held that the filing of an 
administrative complaint before the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission did not suspend the running of the limitations pe-
riod applicable to a parallel discrimination claim brought under title 
42 United States Code section 1981. The Court did not persuasively 
advance, and the dissenters forcefully countered, the possibility that 
tolling would result in actual prejudice to the defendant, given the 
prior existence of a timely title VII claim.37 Rather, the Court relied 
on the presumptive validity of a state statute of limitations expressly 
borrowed by the federal statute conferring the right sued upon, and 
the absence of any competing policy concern affirmatively favoring 
tolling.38 The Johnson majority distinguished American Pipe be-
34. See 414 U.S. at 555 ("the imposition of a time bar would not in this circumstance 
promote the purposes of the statute of limitations"). 
35. See 414 U.S. at 553-54. The Court later stated that the American Pipe decision pro-
tected the "litigatory efficiency served by class actions." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
421 U.S. 454, 465 n.21 (1975). Courts and co=entators have noted the strong emphasis 
placed on this policy in American Pipe. See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 
635 F.2d 603, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1980) (American Pipe implicitly said that the policies behind 
class actions can overcome policies behind statutes of limitations; toll here to prevent protec-
tive motions making class action ineffective), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981); Case Note, 
Antitrust Law- Class Actions - Tolling of Federal Statutes of Limitations - American Pipe 
& Construction Co. v. Utah, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1010, 1014 (1974) (American Pipe 
emphasized economy and efficiency of class actions); Note, supra note 30, at 917 (strong policy 
for tolling in American Pipe was litigative efficiency); Co=ent, supra note 11, at 108 (Ameri-
can Pipe was protecting the class action device). 
36. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
37. The majority suggested that the administrative complaint would satisfy the policies 
behind the statute of limitations only if "there is complete identity of the causes of action." 
421 U.S. at 468 n.14. But givenfactual identity between claims, the defendant is notified of 
both the relevant evidence that must be preserved and the prospect of litigation regarding the 
circumstances that gave rise to both proceedings. See 421 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
38. 421 U.S. at 466 ("We .find no policy reason that excuses petitioner's failure to take the 
minimal steps necessary to preserve each claim independently."). For the purposes of the 
policy analysis contemplated here, it makes no difference whether the statute of limitations is 
expressly provided by federal law as inAmerican Pipe, or is "borrowed" from state law, as in 
Johnson. The interests protected are, of course, the same in both cases. 
In Board of Regents of the Univ. of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1980), 
the Court held that the federal courts must borrow state tolling rules along with the statute of 
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cause in that case "there was a substantial body of relevant federal 
procedural law to guide the decision to toll the limitation period, and 
significant underlying federal policy that would have conflicted with 
a decision not to suspend the running of the statute."39 
Thus, the Court will approve tolling the statute of limitations 
where such a rule will both conform to t~e policy purposes of the 
time bar and serve important independent policy interests.40 The 
Court will not approve tolling the statute where such a rule conforms 
to the policy purposes of the time bar but does not serve important 
independent policy interests. In a more recent opinion, the Court 
made this decision rule explicit by declaring that a plaintiff's "failure 
to comply with the New York statute of limitations (borrowed be-
cause the federal trial court sat in that state), therefore, precluded 
maintenance of this action unless New York's tolling rule is 'inconsis-
tent' with the policies underlying" the federal cause of action.41 
These decisions reflect justifiable deference to the legal force of 
statutes of limitations and the purposes behind them. Regardless of 
the circumstances, the judiciary should not disregard a statutory im-
limitations when they rely on state law to fill a limitations void in federal law. In conjunction 
with the court's conclusion in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980), that 
there is no "direct collision" between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the com-
mencement of actions and a state's tolling provisions, this might suggest a different Rule for 
limitations statutes borrowed from the states. Two considerations render this possibility re-
mote. First, the Court in Tomanio expressly indicated that in a conflict with federal policy the 
state tolling rules must yield. 446 U.S. at 485. Walker was a diversity case where deference to 
state rules is incomparably greater than when those rules are relevant only by the force of 
federal law. The policies behind rule 23 thus weigh in the policy balance whether the repose 
interest is protected by a rule of state or federal origin. q: Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965) (in direct conflict with state rules, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will prevail even in 
diversity cases). Second, the state tolling provisions will almost surely not speak to the case of 
an opt-out plaintiff in a federal class action, and deference to them will therefore not resolve 
the federal procedural question of whether such plaintiffs should benefit from the tolling of the 
limitations period by the filing of the class action. 
39. 421 U.S. at 466 (footnote omitted). The Court also pointed out that the American Pipe 
statute was purely a creature of federal law, and that the subsequent claim asserted there was 
indistinguishable from the original class action. 
40. Even where the Court tolls a statute, it always considers whether the limitations poli-
cies are met. See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 392-95 (1971);Ameri-
can Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-55; Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428-30 (1965). 
In theory, tolling might be required by compelling policy considerations even where the time 
bar policies would be violated, such as where disability prevents legal action before the expira-
tion of the limitations period, so that honoring the limitations policies would completely sacri-
fice interests protected by the substantive law. There is a dearth of authority, however, 
supporting tolling in violation of limitations policies absent some such dramatic countervailing 
interest. But see note 30 supra ( case cited tolled to serve American Pipe policies even though 
tolling violated time bar policies). 
Requiring satisfaction of limitations policies could be problematic. Legislatures often 
adopt time bars without considering or reconsidering the purposes the bars are to serve. See 
.Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 20, at I 185. In spite of this, 
courts have been consistently able to identify the major time bar policies. See notes 48-49, 59 
infta and accompanying text. 
41. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). 
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perative without good reason.42 Similarly, absent an affirmative jus-
tification, the courts should avoid relying on the problematic inquiry 
into whether a prior legal proceeding adequately warns a party to 
prepare the defense of an untimely but related action, since that in-
quiry inherently runs the risk of prejudicing the defendant.43 More-
over, every tolling decision casts doubt on the settled expectations of 
potential defendants, expectations perhaps made more rather than 
less important by involvement in recent litigation related to the 
claim allowed by tolling.44 In short, both theory and authority im-
pose the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff requesting tolling, and 
only an unequivocal showing of a favorable policy outcome will 
carry that burden. 
This standard assumes crucial importance where an opted-out 
class member wishes to bring suit. As Part II demonstrates, tolling in 
such cases often does not clearly offend the policies underlying stat-
42. This standard is consistent with the maxim that statutes of limitations are to be strictly 
enforced. See Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535,539 (1947) (Statutes of limitation "are estab-
lished to cut off rights, justifiable or not, that might otherwise be asserted and they must be 
strictly adhered to by the judiciary. . . . Remedies for resulting inequities are to be provided 
by Congress, not by the courts.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Hall v. E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp. 358, 360-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (power to create tolling exceptions 
judicially is limited by the general rule that when a statute of limitations exists, it acts as a total 
bar; there is a strong congressional policy favoring repose in antitrust suits). This maxim, if 
applied absolutely, would never admit tolling. Still, it does suggest that courts should pay great 
deference to the limitation enacted by the legislature. 
43. A particular defendant might have had notice of the claim before filing, and so not 
have a repose interest. But tolling on this ground would pose two troublesome questions to 
potential defendants. First, what constitutes "notice" could be difficult to define. In Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Supreme Court questioned whether a title 
VII race discrimination claim provided notice to the defendant of a later race discrimination 
claim filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The majority concluded that "[o]nly where there is com-
plete identity of the causes of action will the protections suggested [notice to defendant of the 
claim] ... necessarily exist .... " 421 U.S. at 467 n.14 (emphasis added). Three dissenters 
felt notice sufficient, given that the defendant was aware of the "grievance," when the separate 
claims "arise out of the same factual situation." 421 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Second, whether this "notice" is sufficient to satisfy the limita-
tions policies can also prove problematic. Compare 421 U.S. at 467 n.14 (need identical claims 
for court to assess influence on repose interest of defendant), with 421 U.S. at 475-76 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (time bar policies satisfied "since the claims 
are essentially equivalent in substance"). 
If the tolling inquiry were limited to satisfaction of limitations policies, defendants would 
only be protected by these problematic distinctions. 
44. See notes 55-59 infra and accompanying text. Any tolling doctrine, no matter how 
narrow, will marginally decrease the certainty provided by time bars. A defendant might be 
sued long after a tort, for example, where the victim was an infant at the time of the tort. See 
notes 20-21 supra. 
Experience with the magnitude of potential liability in class actions might well intensify 
the interest of potential defendants in expecting freedom from litigation - and its expenses -
protected by the statute of limitations. Notice of one suit simply does not satisfy the right of 
potential defendants not to bear the burdens and uncertainties of litigation after the expiration 
of the statutory period. See .Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 20, at 
1185 (defendant should be secure in the reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped 
clean of ancient obligations); Special Project, supra note 11, at 1089 ("Predicability is the key 
to fulfillment of the policies embodied in statutes of limitations."). 
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utes of limitations.45 The opted-out plaintiff, however, cannot show 
any additional reason favoring tolling.46 The decision rule alone can 
determine this particular tolling decision. 
IL APPLICATION OF THE TOLLING STANDARD 
Application of this analysis to the opted-out plaintiff demon-
strates that courts should not toll the statute oflimitations.47 Though 
tolling will not violate the time bar policies, the plaintiff cannot as-
sert any independent reason in support of tolling. This Part will first 
examine the underlying limitations policies, and then analyze these 
policies in the opt-out context. The last section will then scrutinize 
rationales advanced to support tolling. 
A. Statutes of Limitations Purposes 
The basic policy of statutes of limitations is fairness to the de-
fendant.48 This policy has two distinct components. First, the statute 
protects the fair adjudication of the claim by ensuring notice of the 
need to defend against it.49 The statute prevents "surprises through 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber."50 Through 
prompt filing of a claim, the plaintiff informs the defendant of the 
necessity of preserving evidence.51 Without this notice, the defen-
dant must bear the excessive costs, of preserving evidence, or must 
defend after "evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and wit-
nesses have disappear~d."52 This element of fairness also relieves 
45. See notes 60-71 infra and accompanying text. 
46. See notes 72-151 infra and accompanying text. 
47. Courts tolling for opt-out plaintiffs do not seem to engage in any structured analysis. 
See cases cited in note 15 supra. They might agree that a strong policy reason need be shown, 
but they apparently assume the American Pipe policies apply. In following the analysis devel-
oped in Part I, this Note will probe this assumption. 
48. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394 (1977); Burnett v. New York 
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965); Wood v. Combustion Engr., Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 347 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Eastridge v. Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.R.D. 129, 131 (W.D. Ky. 1971); United States v. 
Vibradamp Corp., 257 F. Supp. 931, 939-40 (S.D. Cal. 1966); J)evelopmenls in the Law: Slal-
ules of Limitations, supra note 20, at 1185; Special Project, supra note 11, at 1084. 
49. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (unjust not to put 
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation); Isthmian Lines, Inc. v. Rosling, 
360 F.2d 926, 927 (2d Cir. 1966) (defendant had timely notice of alleged dereliction); Special 
Project, supra note 11, at 1017. 
50. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); 
see American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 
726, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 
F.2d 979, 994 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
51. See D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904,908 (1st Cir. 1958) (notice given 
to defendant as warning to preserve evidence); Hodges v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 268, 270 
(Ct. Cl. 1953) (apprise defendant of the necessity of keeping records and witnesses). 
52. Order ofR. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). 
See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Chase Sec. Corp. v. 
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (spare defendant the burden of defense after evidence is 
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the courts of "the burden of trying stale claims."53 Courts sometimes 
speak of this interest in procedural fairness as the only purpose of 
statutes of limitations,54 and in any given case it may be the most 
important. But the limitation of actions also protects the interests of 
those not parties to a particular suit. 
The second component of the fairness interest advanced by stat-
utes of limitations involves the interest of potential defendants in the 
expectation of freedom from litigation.55 This is the "repose inter-
est." At its core is the notion that the passage of time confers legiti-
macy on legal relationships, and that within reasonable limits the 
law should seek to bring "security and stability to human affairs"56 
by insulating the fruits of past conduct from legal interference. 57 
The classic illustration of legal respect for the repose interest is the 
doctrine of adverse possession. 58 
gone); Homey v. United States, 536 F.2d 360, 364 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976) 
(spare defendant after memories had faded); De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator 
Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (protect defendant from defending 
after evidence is lost). 
Such burdens would unfairly hinder the defense. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
421 U.S. 454, 473 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
53. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965); see United States v. West-
ern P.R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,314 (1945); 
Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); Luckenbach S.S. 
Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1963). 
This policy is balanced by the need to give plaintiffs adequate time to vindicate their rights. 
See text at note 25 supra. 
54. The assumption in cases like American Pipe and Burnett is that notice to the particular 
defendant satisfies all of the policies behind limitations statutes. 
55. See Greyhound Corp. v. Mount Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 334 (1978); El Paso v. 
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497,516 (1965); Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482,485 (1947); Shepherd 
v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231, 235 (1887); Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667, 675-76 (2d Cir. 
1977); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); G. NEW-
SOM & L. ABEL-SMITH, PRESTON AND NEWSOM ON LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 2-3 (3d ed. 1953) 
(long dormant claims have more cruelty than justice in them); H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 8 (4th ed. 1916) (statutes of limitation are 
statutes of repose); Special Project, supra note 11, at 1016 (protects defendant's reasonable 
expectations and repose). 
Justice Holmes has presented a common sense foundation for the repose interest: 
[T]he foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked for in the 
position of the person who gains them, not in that of the loser. . . • A thing which you 
have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes 
root in your being and cannot be tom away without your resenting the act and trying to 
defend yourself, however you came by it The law can ask no better justification than the 
deepest instincts of man. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,477 (1897). 
56. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). 
51. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385,401 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(promote repose by giving security and stability); H. WooD, supra note 55, at 9 (statutes of 
limitations are essential to ·security). 
For the statutes to have these salutary effects, some degree of certainty is needed. Little 
stability is gained if time bars could be easily avoided. See note 44 supra. 
58. See Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 470, 476-77 (1831) ("Statutes of limitations have 
been emphatically and justly denominated statutes of repose. . • • This remark is peculiarly 
applicable to land titles."). 
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Although somewhat amorphous, the repose interest has a place 
in any accurate account of t~e fundamental values underlying stat-
utes of limitations: 
The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the 
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that 
. the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the 
right to prosecute them.59 
Both of these interests deserve consideration in determining the con-
sistency of a decision to toll with the functional purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations. 
B. Limitations Policies and the Opt-Out Plaintiff 
Tolling the statute for one who opts out of an ongoing class ac-
tion will typically not violate these policies because the original class 
action ensures that the defendant has notice of the claims against 
~~~~~a~~~~~~~~~fy~~~ 
the trial court already has certified the class.61 In certifying the class, 
the judge must have found that the class representatives' claims "are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class,"62 that "questions of 
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate,"63 and 
that the representatives will "fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class."64 These findings inform the defendants of the 
claims made on behalf of class members, including those members 
who later opt out.65 
Nor does tolling force a defendant to incur excessive costs in pre-
paring a defense against the opt-out plaintiff. The defendant already 
has to locate witnesses, revive memories, and find evidence to defend 
the class suit.66 The separate suit filed after the opt-out would use 
the same witnesses and evidence.67 While tolling would create some 
additional costs in the preservation and use of evidence at a second 
59. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944) (em-
phasis added). 
60. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553-55 (1974) (defendant has 
notice even when class certification denied). 
61. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text. 
62. Feo. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(3). 
63. Feo. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3). 
64. Feo. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(4). 
65. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974). 
66. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring) (suit with intervenors after class status denied would involve the same memo-
ries, witnesses, and subject matter as the original suit and is fair to the defendant). CJ.' Colum-
bia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217 U.S. 547, 554 (1910) (proceeding for a reassessment 
was not a new action and is therefore not subject to the operation of the statute of limitations). 
61. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (suit with intervenors after class status denied would involve the same memories, 
witnesses, and subject matter as the original suit and is fair to the defendant). 
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trial, these costs would not be oppressively excessive. 68 
A similar analysis applies to the repose interest. Class certifica-
tion informs the defendant "of the number and generic identities of 
the potential plaintiffs .... "69 More particularly, the defendant 
cannot assume the opt-out plaintiff will not sue. Between the class 
action filing and the class member's opt out, the defendant must as-
sume that he will have to defend against all class members.70 Since 
the original class action notifies the defendant of the collective claim 
against him, he has no reason to expect complete security against the 
lesser included claim of the individual who chooses to opt out. And 
so long as potential defendants may rely on security against claims 
they have no reason to know about, a decision to permit tolling for 
claims of which the defendant has timely notice will not cast unrea-
sonable doubt on the stability of legal relationships. Tolling for the 
opt-out plaintiff therefore appears consistent with the purposes of the 
time bar.71 As developed in Part I, however, this of itself does not 
68. It is arguable that the policies behind statutes of limitations are violated here because 
the defendant has a repose interest in not having to defend a greater number of suits and that 
the tremendous cost of a second suit does create excessive evidence costs for the defendant. 
However, this Note assumes that the policies behind the statutes of limitations are not violated 
for two reasons. First, this assumption presents the best case for the argument that the statute 
should be tolled. Without this assumption, the policy of repose would be violated and the 
plaintiff would have to show an even stronger policy reason to justify tolling. Even with this 
assumption this Note will show that the statute should not be tolled. Second, this assumption 
is more consistent with the Court's discussion of statutes of limitations inAmerican Pipe. See 
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974) (limitations policies satis-
fied when the defendant has notice of the claims and potential plantiffs). 
69. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974). 
70. See .Developments in the Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1451 (defendant faced 
with information about potential liability to the class cannot be said to have reached a state of 
repose that should be protected). Suspending the statute during this time would not violate the 
defendant's repose interest even if there were a long time left after the tolling stopped. The 
suspension adds the same amount of time to the statutory period for bringing suit whether it 
occurs near the end of the period or in the middle. When the reason for tolling ceases to exist, 
the statute starts running again for whatever time it has left. This is no different than tolling 
for the length of a plaintiff's disability. See notes 20-21 supra. q: note 68 supra (,tl.merican 
Pipe assumed no repose interest when class certification denied). 
71. The only problematic time bar policy is the incentive to file early. (See Burnett v. New 
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (statute runs on those who have slept on their 
rights); Wood v. Carpenter, IOI U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (time bars "punish negligence"); H. 
Wooo, supra note 55, at 9-10; see also text at note 25 supra. In American Pipe, the Court 
apparently thought this policy served if the defendant had adequate notice: 
The policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants and of barring a plaintiff who 
"has slept on his rights" are satisfied when, as here, a named plaintiff who is found to be 
representative of a class commences a suit and thereby notifies the defendants not only of 
the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and generic 
identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment. Within the pe-
riod set by the statute of limitations, the defendants have the essential information neces-
sary to determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation . . . . 
414 U.S. at 554-55 (1974) (citation omitted). The reasoning seems to be that since the class 
representative filed on time; the intervenors in this action are also timely as the defendant had 
notice of their claims. In the opt-out situation, where the class is certified, a similar argument 
can be made. The class representative filed a timely claim. The class was certified "as soon as 
practicable." The plaintiff then opted out within the time set by the court. Since th.: defendant 
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suffice to justify suspending the limitations period. 
C. Independent Reasons for Tolling 
To justify tolling, the opt-out plaintiff still must establish an af-
firmative policy reason favoring suspension of the statute. After ex-
amining possible rationales, this section concludes that the plaintiff 
cannot show such a reason. 
The policies of the statute upon which the plaintiff sues off er one 
possible reason for tolling.72 For example, the plaintiff might argue 
that the interest in enforcing the antitrust laws justifies tolling. This 
rationale does not suffice. First, whether this particular plaintiff sues 
or not, the original class action will vindicate the statutory purpose; a 
violation of the statute will not go unpunished.73 Second, the plain-
tiff can still satisfy her claim, and hence the statutory policy, within 
the class action.74 Refusing to toll does not prevent the plaintiff from 
enforcing the statute, but rather limits the forum in which she can 
proceed.75 Third, whatever the social benefits of prosecuting the 
claim, the plaintiff has lost her individual right to sue due to the 
passage of time. Every meritorious action vindicates some important 
policy; every plaintiff could assert this policy as justifying an exten-
sion. Statutes of limitations, however, "are established to cut off 
rights, justifiable or not, that might otherwise be asserted . . . ."76 
The filing of a class action did not prevent the plaintiff from filing 
her own suit.77 Absent infancy, insanity, imprisonment, war, death, 
had notice of the claim from the beginning, and the opt-out plaintiff followed the rule 23 
procedures promptly, arguably the "incentive to suit" policy is satisfied. The policy is satisfied 
at least to the extent it was in American Pipe. Given this reasoning, the opt-out plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the purposes of the limitations statute will not be violated by tolling. See 
.Developments in the Law- ClassActions,supra note 8, at 1449-50 (tolling not limited to those 
who were actually relying on the class action because among other reasons, notice protects the 
interests of the defendant). 
An analogy can be made to amendments to the pleadings which relate back to the date of 
filing because the defendant has notice of the nature of the amended claim. See .Developments 
in the Law- Class Actions,supra note 8, at 1451-53. 
72. See note 26 supra. 
73. The actions of the plaintiffs who remain in the class and the opted-out plaintiff concern 
predominately common questions. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3). 
74. Instead of opting out, the plaintiff could enter an appearance, intervene in the action, 
or file a motion for subclassing. See notes 101-13 infra and accompanying text. All of these 
measures give the plaintiff some measure of control in the action. The plaintiff could also 
remain a passive class member, and let others prosecute the claim. Given the desire to opt out, 
the other options would probably be more satisfying. 
75. The plaintiff would be forced to proceed in the forum of the class action, and would 
have less control of the suit then she would in a private action. q: notes 101-13 infra and 
accompanying text (methods for class member to take a more active role in the prosecution of 
the class suit). 
76. Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947) (restating maxim that judges must strictly 
adhere to statutes of limitations). 
77. Opting out prevents the class action judgment from binding the self-excluded class 
members. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. 
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or fraudulent concealment,78 the courts were open to the plaintiff 
and filing an action was not beyond her control. Thus, while the 
underlying right of action might itself justify tolling for a plaintiff 
who without fault was unable to file a timely claim, it cannot justify 
tolling for an opt-out plaintiff who has slept on her private rights for 
the duration of the limitations period. 
The plaintiff might argue that lack of knowledge of the right to 
sue is a disability justifying tolling. She could contend that the stat-
ute should be tolled until she became aware of the cause of action. 
This is no excuse, in the absence of fraudulent concealment, for fail-
ing to file a timely action.79 Especially if a large claim is at stake,80 
the plaintiff cannot claim that the harm was too trivial to·. investi-
gate. 81 The barring of a lawsuit in this case does not differ from the 
enforcement of any other time bar. 82 The plaintiff, then, must look 
to the policies reflected in the class action procedure to justify tolling 
the statute. 
78. If any of these disabilities are present, the court, of course, should suspend the statute 
for the duration of the disability. See notes 20-21 supra. 
19. See, e.g., Premium Management, Inc. v. Walker, 648 F.2d 778, 781 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(ordinary ignorance of cause of action is not a reason to toll); Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & 
Co., 522 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1975) (will not toll if just ignorant of the law or of the 
existence of the cause of action); Hart v. First Natl. Bank, 373 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(ignorance of cause of action is not enough to toll); Harper v. Harper, 252 F. 39, 43 (4th Cir. 
1918) (mere lack of knowledge of actionable wrong does not suspend statute of limitations); 
French v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 88 F. Supp. 714, 723 (D.N.J. 1950) (mere igno-
rance that one has a cause of action or of facts giving rise to a cause of action not sufficient to 
toll). 
80. One who opts out of a class action to bring her own suit must have a large claim to 
make the huge costs of a separate action worthwhile. 
81. The size of the claim should also provide a strong incentive to file on time. 
American Pipe extended tolling even to those unaware of the class action. See 414 U.S. 
538, 551-52 (1974). Possibly the Court reasoned that many of these class members would have 
claims too trivial to investigate, or to file a separate action. Tolling for these small claimants 
would further the policy behind rule 23 of vindicating the rights of all who are victimized. See 
note 89 infra. These claimants, after the denial of certification, could then still avail them-
selves of the relatively inexpensive intervention option. This policy is of little relevance to the 
opt-out situation, where only those with large claims would go to the expense of separate suits. 
82. Some statutes of limitations expressly provide that the statute will not start to run until 
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered her cause of action, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 52-584 (1981), but these are the exceptions. A statute that begins to run when the 
cause of action accrues makes the plaintiffs lack of knowledge of the cause of action irrele-
vant. The legislature made a choice by adopting a statute that runs with the accrual of the 
action 7ather than when the plaintiff discovers the cause of action. 
It might be harder for a plaintiff to discover that he or she has been illegally harmed by an 
economic crime such as an antitrust violation, but the solution for this is to have Congress 
adopt a different kind of statute of limitations. Congress did adopt a special statute of limita-
tions in antitrust actions under the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976) (statute of limita-
tions tolled during pendency of government suit and one year thereafter). The plaintiff is 
allowed to discover his or her cause of action by learning of the government suit and is then 
allowed one year after the outcome is known to bring his or her own suit. 
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Ill. REFUSING To TOLL AND AMERICAN PIPE 
An opt-out plaintiff might assert a final reason for tolling: sus-
pension of the time bar furthers the rule 23 class action policies. In 
American Pipe, the Supreme Court tolled to preserve the efficiency 
of the class action procedure.83 Some courts have apparently con-
strued the decision to require tolling in all class action situations, 84 a 
tendency reinforced by the Eisen dicta. A plaintiff, pointing to the 
broad language of those decisions, would argue that a refusal to toll 
would lead to the unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and mo-
tions that so concerned the American Pipe Court. 85 
This Part analyzes the effect of tolling on the class action policies 
protected by American Pipe. It concludes that not only do class ac-
tion policies fail to justify tolling, but tolling would conflict with the 
basic purposes of the class action procedure. Opt-out plaintiffs who 
wish to toll the statute of limitations, then, face a final barrier to suit: 
tolling would give rise to the very problems that American Pipe 
sought to prevent. 
A. Class Action Policies 
The fundamental objectives of class actions are to promote judi-
cial economy and to prevent inconsistent adjudications. 86 The proce-
dure promotes economies of time, effort, and expense by resolving 
the claims of an entire class in one lawsuit. Class actions promote 
uniformity of decision by binding all members of the class to the 
final judgment. 87 Without this procedure, courts would waste time 
and resources deciding the same issues on the same evidence in 
many separate actions;88 moreover these separate actions create the 
83. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text. 
84. See cases cited in notes 15-16, 19 supra. 
85. See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551-54; Note, supra note 20, at 756-58. 
86. The rules committee's note to rule 23 states: "Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those 
cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and pro-
mote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural 
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee 
note on 1966 amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 73, 102-03 (1966). See American Pipe & 
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550-56 (1974); New York v. General Motors Corp., 60 
F.R.D. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974); Illinois v. 
Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 489-92 (N.D. Ill. 1969); American Trading & 
Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Philadelphia Elec. 
Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 458-60 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 
F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS§ l 160(i) (1977); 
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1754 (1972); Kaplan, 
Continuing Work of the Civil Commitlee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (I}, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356,390 (1967). 
81. See text at note 9 supra. 
88. Many separate actions would be unavoidable. To qualify as a class suit, the class must 
be "so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable .•.. " FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(l). 
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possibility of inconsistent adjudications. 89 
Basic principles of fairness, however, constrain the pursuit of ju-
dicial efficiency. Rule 23 incorporates various safeguards to protect 
the interests of class members, including the opt-out provision it-
self.90 If tolling is essential to the fair adjudication of individual 
claims, then a sound reason may support suspending the limitations 
period, quite independently of the efficiency concerns so prominent 
in American Pipe. 
B. Class Actions and the Opt-Out Plaint!ff 
The best argument for the opt-out plaintiff is that class members 
are not only interested in whether the class is certified, but also in 
how the class is certified.91 The trial court may grant certification 
89. The class action procedure also serves other purposes not relevant to the tolling prob-
lem. First, it protects large groups of plaintiffs who are harmed by a similar wrong but whose 
injuries are too small to justify individual actions. See Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 
F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (providing a forum for plaintiffs with small claims is a purpose of class 
actions), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 445 :U.S. 940 (1980); Klenk & Kelly, Rule 23 
(1966) Purposes & Prerequisites, in CLASS ACTIONS 2-1, [2-9 to 2-11] (Illinois Institute For 
Continuing Legal Education ed. 1974) (forum for small claimants is a purpose of class ac-
tions); 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1160(h) (one of the purposes of rule 23 is providing a 
forum for small plaintiffs); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1754, at 543 (protect-
ing small claimant is an objective of rule 23). Second, class actions help in vindicating statu-
tory policies. Actions creating harm that is widespread and so causes only slight individual 
injunes would not be deterred without the class action device making aggregate enforcement 
suits feasible. See Klenk & Kelly, supra, at [2.6]; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1160(k); 
Developments in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1373. 
Since only plaintiffs with relatively large sums at stake would consider opting out, see note 
80 supra, these concerns do not effect the tolling question. 
90. The Advisory Committee Notes are replete with references to "measures which can be 
taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions." FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes 
on 1966 amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D 69, 99 (1966). Rule 23(b)(3) actions, for example, 
must not sacrifice "procedural fairness." FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on 1966 
amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory 
committee notes on 1966 amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966) (subdivision d "is 
concerned with the fair and efficient conduct of the action"). The Committee ensured fairness 
by, for example, requiring notice to class members in (b)(3) actions, see id. at 107, and making 
notice available in (b)(l) and (b)(2) actions. FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on 
1966 amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 106-07 (1966). 
91. TheAmerican Pipe Court hinted at this when it said: "Not until the existence and limits 
of the class have been established . . . does a class member have any duty to take note of the 
suit or to exercise any responsibility with respect to it in order to profit from the eventual out-
come of the case." 414 U.S. at 552 (emphasis added). Arguably this passage allows class 
members to sit and wait until the certification decision; the decision to file separately could be 
postponed until then. A commentator, who favors tolling, disposes of this particular pro-toll-
ing position: 
A weakness with this argument is that when the Court stated that putative members need 
not take note of the suit until certification, the Court was anticipating that after certifica-
tion the members y.,ould participate as class members rather than opt out. The putative 
members therefore were regarded as passive beneficiaries. Members opting out, however, 
are not passive beneficiaries of the class. They intend to exercise their rights independent 
of the class action and arguably they should exercise those rights independent of the bene-
fits that the passive beneficiaries receive. 
Note, supra note 20, at 756 (footnotes omitted). 
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pursuant to various orders and conditions92 which may be crucial to 
the opt-out decision. Limits may be imposed on the variety of legal 
theories available to the class representative,93 for example, or alter-
natively, the certification process might raise doubts among some 
class members as to the adequacy of class representation.94 The class 
representative might even reach a tentative partial or full settlement, 
on behalf of the class, with the defendant prior to certification.95 A 
class member disappointed by this settlement might want to preserve 
the option of a separate suit until the court decides the certification 
question and issues an appropriate order.96 In the absence of tolling, 
individual actions could become time-barred during the certification 
period.97 
This raises two possibilities. On the one hand, class members 
might be unfairly denied their individual rights by being forced to 
92. Rule 23( d) gives the district court wide discretion to control the class action suit. The 
court "may make appropriate orders ... imposing conditions on the representative parties or 
on intervenors .... " FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d)(3). 
93. q: .Developments in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1479-80 (arguing that 
courts may be in error if they allow a case to proceed with conflicting legal theories), 
94. See Note, supra note 20, at 756-57. 
95. See 5 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5570c (1977). One court sug-
gested that it is highly desirable for the trial judge to designate the class representative to 
conduct settlement negotiations. See Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 
33 (3d Cir. 1971). 
As a practical matter, if the defendant reached a satisfactory settlement with the class rep-
resentative, the defendant would see no need to contest the class certification decision. Absent 
any other safeguards, see notes 101-13 infra and accompanying text, only the vigilance of the 
court protects the putative class members from an unjust certification or inadequate settlement. 
Other conditions might also be imposed pursuant to certification. Intervention might be 
limited. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d)(3); Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 385 F.2d 122, 123 (3d 
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 995 (1968) (not abuse of discretion to impose a time limit for 
possible intervention). Courts, however, are restrained in the limits they can impose on inter-
vention. Intervention is of right if the class representative inadequately protects the inter-
venor's interest. See notes 103-04 infra and accompanying text. Courts also have an interest in 
granting intervention. See text at note 106 infra. Finally, even if intervention is denied, class 
members can always make an appearance. See text at notes 108-10 infra. These safeguards 
serve to minimize any potential distress about restrictions on intervention in certification or-
ders. 
In some cases brought under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-9lf (1976), the 
certification order will restrict the monetary damages available to class members. A statutory 
formula limits the damages in class suits. Individuals filing separate suits could usually re-
cover more than that available as a pro rata share of the class judgment. See, e.g., Brame v. 
Ray Bills Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568, 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). This certification restriction is not 
crucial to the opt-out decision. Putative class members who know of the class action will im-
mediately file suits to avoid the class action monetary limit. They will always file suits to 
preserve the greater individual recoveries. How the class is certified is unimportant; if the class 
is certified, the statutory limit is mandatory. Because it is mandatory, individuals have no 
interest in waiting to see how the class is certified in order to make the opt-out decision. 
96. But cf. note 128 infra (This "sideline sitting" is analogous to the "one-way interven-
tion" that 1966 amendments to rule 23 specifically tried to eliminate.), 
97. The class certification process can take years. See Mills v. The Electric Auto-Lite Co., 
No. 63 C 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (class upheld after 107 months, 26 days); Zolotnitzky v. 
Yablok, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Victorian Investors v.-Responsive Envts. 
Corp., 56 F.R.D. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class upheld 33 months after suit was filed). 
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remain in the class action. On the other, they might file protective 
motions and claims to preserve a meaningful opt-out opportunity.98 
These filings would all be superfluous if, after certification, the class 
members decided to remain in the class action. In short, tolling 
might avoid precisely the "multiplicity of activity''99 which the Amer-
ican Pipe Court tried to prevent. The procedural safeguards incor-
porated in rule 23, however, minimize both of these dangers. 
1) Fairness 
A number of considerations suggest that tolling is not required to 
protect the rights of individual class members. Because the court 
retains the flexibility to alter or amend the certification order at any 
time before the decision on the merits, 100 class members can attempt 
to cure the defects in the order rather than going to the trouble and 
expense of a private action. Class action procedures make use of this 
flexibility by providing several methods to protect the interests of 
individual class members. 101 
First, the class member may "intervene";102 that is, the member 
can join the named representatives in court to prosecute the class 
suit. Intervention ensures that the interests of all members are pro-
tected, even if the representative fails to defend them. Interven-
tion is of right if the class representative inadequately protects 
the intervenor's interest;103 otherwise, it is at the court's discretion.104 
98. See Note, supra note 20, at 757-58. 
99. 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1976). Note these claims and motions are unnecessary only if the 
class member decides to remain in the class action. If the class member decides to pursue a 
separate action, she must file a claim. 
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l). Orders entered under authority of subdivision (d) "may be 
altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d). 
IOI. See generally 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY,supra note 7, ~~ 23.07 [I], at 23-213, 23.45 
[4.-5) at 23-394 (if court finds claims not adequately represented it can redefine the class, 
subclass, or allow intervention); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1765 (1972 & 
Supp. 1982); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1793 (1972 & Supp. 1982) (meth-
ods to make representation adequate). 
102. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2), 24. These two rules should be harmonized in their 
application to class actions. The right to intervene is placed in the class action rule to ensure 
an opportunity for each view to be heard. See 1A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, 
§ 1799, at 253. 
For discussions of how intervention is used in class actions, see 3B J. MOORE & J. KEN-
NEDY, supra note 7, ~ 23.90[2]; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1799; JJevelop-
ments in the Law: Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1482-85; Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of 
Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivision (d}, IO B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 577, 583-89 
(1969). lntervenors in class suits are not barred by the statute of limitations. See American 
Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551 ("commencement of the [class] action satisified the purpose of the limita-
tion provision as to all those who might subsequently participate in the suit") ( emphasis added). 
103. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides for intervention of right 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a 
statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of 
the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
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Courts allow intervention liberally to achieve class action objec-
tives.105 By granting a motion for intervention, the court both ob-
tains fresh insight into the composition of class interests and protects 
the final judgment from attack on due process grounds because of 
inadequate representation. 106 Intervention, then, can serve to vindi-
cate the rights of those who would otherwise feel a need to opt 
out.101 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties. 
In the class certification proceedings, the court determines whether the named plaintiffs "will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(4); see text at 
note 64 supra. A class member seeking intervention of right would alert the court that some 
class interests were overlooked in the certification process, and would give the court an oppor-
tunity to correct the oversight. See notes 105-06 infra and accompanying text. 
104. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) provides for permissive intervention: 
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (I) when a 
statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an appli• 
cant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. 
When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or 
executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon 
any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute 
or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to 
intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the 
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original 
parties. 
In application, this rule should be harmonized with rule 23(d)(2). Rule 23(d)(2) provides 
that the court "may make appropriate orders:" 
(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair 
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some 
or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, 
or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair 
and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the 
action. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d)(2). 
105. See 1A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1799, at 254; lJevelopmen/s in //,e 
Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1485 & n.164. 
106. See generally 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 7, ~ 23.07(1], at 23-199; 
Klenk & Kelly, supra note 89, § 2.~8. 
Since class action~ only bind absentee members whose interests have been adequately rep-
resented, Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961), courts have a 
strong incentive to ensure this adequacy. If the representation is later declared inadequate, the 
efficiency and uniformity of adjudication goals of the class action procedure, see text at notes 
86-89 supra, are not attainable. The absentee class members would be free to bring individual 
suits, with all the waste of judicial resources and possibility ofinconsistent results that implies. 
The Fifth Circuit has gone a step further to ensure adequacy of representation. They re-
quire counsel for plaintiff to report problems with the adequacy of representation to the court. 
See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176-78 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). A plaintiff who was willing to opt out of the class and bring her 
own suit would, if she stayed in the class action, probably ensure that the court knew about 
inadequate representation of her interests. 
107. A court may restrict or impose conditions on intervention. See note 95supra. Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23( d)(3) allows the court to permit or restrict intervention to whatever 
level will adequately represent all of the class interests and still allow for the efficient prosecu-
tion of the suit. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1799, at 258. Because of 
the important due process and notice to the court aspects of intervention, however, courts 
should start with a presumption in favor of intervention. Id. at 254; lJevelopmenls in //,e Law 
- Class Actions, supra note.8, at 1484-85. 
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Second, the class member has the right to make an "appearance" 
after certification.108 T~ough not well defined, it allows the member 
to receive copies of all papers :filed with the court and gives the plain-
tiff formal representation for tactical purposes.109 The plaintiff, kept 
abreast of all developments in the suit, can judge if her interests are 
being adequately protected. If they are not she can inform the 
judge.110 
Finally, if a large number of class members have differing inter-
ests, the court can split the class into subclasses111 or maintain the 
suit as a partial class action. 112 The court can also direct notice to 
class members so that they may express their views on the adequacy 
of representation. 113 -
These procedures allow class members to cure defects in certifica-
tion orders in a relatively inexpensive manner. If the court imposes 
limits on the legal theories of relief to prevent conflicts in the class, a 
disgruntled class member can petition for subclassing.114 Each sub-
By giving the court this insight, intervention enables "those class members on the outside of 
the litigation to function as effective watchdogs to make certain that the action is fully and 
fairly conducted." 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1799, at 252. 
108. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(2)(C) provides that "any member who does not request exclu-
sion [from the class] may, ifhe desires, enter an appearance through his counsel." The plaintiff 
does not have to show inadequate representation in order to enter an appearance. 3 H. NEW-
BERG, supra note 86, at§ 4140;see 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,supra note 86, § 1799, at 255-
58. 
109. See Newberg, supra note 102, at 588 (discussion of policy considerations in defining 
the scope of an "appearance"). 
110. If in fact interests are not adequately protected, she can intervene as of right. See text 
at note 103 supra. 
111. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(4)(B); 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1120g; Developments 
in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1479-82 ("Subclassing provides ... a means of 
increasing the reliability of party representation of absentee interests by, in effect, adding addi-
tional parties to the lawsuit who more accurately reflect in their own interests the interests of 
discrete groups of absentees.") (id. at 1479). Under rule 23, each subclass is treated as a class, 
with the rest of the rule's requirements applied accordingly. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(4)(B). See 
Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1980) (denial of subclass certifica-
tion), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 
F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1975) (each subclass must meet the rule 23 prerequisites). 
Subclassing is required when the plaintiff class has diverse interests, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975), or when different 
class members seek different remedies. See, e.g., Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 
1197, 1200-01 (6th Cir. 1974). When the named representatives do not adequately represent 
the class, the court must take measures such as subclassing or decertification. Johnson v. Un-
cle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419,423 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 451 
U.S. 902 (1981). 
112. "[A]n action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular 
issues .... " FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(4)(A); see 1A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, 
§ 1790. This procedure resolves common issues in the class action, leaving the rest for individ-
ual suits. 
113. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d)(2). 
114. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 1011 (1975); Green v. Sante Fe Indus., 88 F.R.D. 575, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Vuyanich v. 
Republic Natl. Bank of Dallas, 78 F.R.D. 352, 356 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Developments in the Law 
- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1479-82. 
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class would then assert separate claims, a result which would pre-
serve all tenable theories without opting out. If doubts exist as to the 
adequacy of representation, the plaintiff can move to intervene. In 
all of these situations, the trial court would have a strong incentive to 
modify its original certification order. By modifying the order, en-
suring that the class action suit accurately reflects all the class inter-
ests, the court protects the final judgment from attack on due process 
grounds.115 
The court can also ensure that any proposed settlement is in the 
interests of all class members. 116 Under rule 23, "[a] class action 
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the 
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be 
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court di-
rects."117 In reviewing the settlement, the district court "must care-
fully consider certain factors and comply with certain procedural 
safeguards to ensure that the settlement is in the interests of the class, 
does not unfairly impinge on the rights and interests of dissenters, 
I 15. See generally note 106 supra; Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1058 
(5th Cir. 1979) (binding effect of class judgment on absentee members depends on the ade-
quacy of representation in the class suit). 
I 16. The fear of an inadequate settlement is crucial to the tolling question only when the 
settlement is reached prior to, or shortly after, class certification. If a settlement is reached 
long after certification, the class members can no longer opt out, see note 8 supra, so tolling is 
irrelevant. If a class member with a large claim does fear an inadquate settlement, there seems 
to be little reason for her to delay filing her individual claim. While delay allows her to evalu-
ate the certification process before making the decision to file separately, it does nothing to 
protect her from an inadequate settlement long after certification. 
117. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(e). This rule does not apply until an action has been certified as a 
"class action" under rule 23(c)(l). Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1303-04 (4th Cir. 
1978); Weight Watchers of Philadelphia v. Weight Watchers Intl., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 
1973); see Wheeler, supra note 30, at 775 n.16a. Contra Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 616 {E.D. Wis. 1975). 
The problem of pre-certification settlements has two aspects. First, a class representative 
might negotiate a settlement of his individual claim and seek dismissal of the class action alle-
gations in the complaint. Putative class members who relied on the class action filing to vindi-
cate their rights might now be time-barred. Courts, however, can easily remedy this situation. 
The district judge can require that "a plaintiff, who has voluntarily assumed the fiduciary role 
of a class representative, does not abandon that role to the prejudice of the class he has as-
sumed to represent or for his own improper personal aggrandizement." Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 
582 F.2d 1298, 1306 (4th Cir. 1978); see Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 67 
{S.D. Tex. 1977); see also Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 213 (1945). In exercising this 
discretion, the court examines directly the reliance interest of absent class members. See 
Shelton, 582 F.2d at 1315; Besse v. Verman, 60 F.R.D 414, 414-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Elias v. 
National Car Rental Sys., 59 F.R.D. 276,277 {D. Minn. 1973). Because of this examination, 
pre-certification settlement of individual actions will not prejudice class members, nor affect 
the opt-out tolling question. 
The second aspect of pre-certification settlement is when the class representative settles the 
class claims. The defendant would then have every incentive not to oppose the certification 
decision. See note 95 supra. With certification granted, rule 23(e} would then apply, and 
courts would use the high standard of review described in the text. See text at notes 118-21 
infra. 
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and does not merely mantle oppression."118 As a background for 
this detailed review, the court must realize "the potential for abuse is 
much greater when class actions are resolved through a settlement 
•••• "
119 To prevent any such abuse, "the district court acts as a 
fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class 
members." 120 With this high level of scrutiny, inadequate settlements 
reached prior to certification stand little chance of approval, espe-
cially where class members object to the settlement. 121 
Given that rule 23 provides several methods to protect the inter-
ests of the class, and to ensure class members the right to vindicate 
their individual claims, tolling does not advance any policy of fair-
118. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1214 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). 
119. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1169 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). The court explained: 
Because of the limited control exercised by any particular class member over the decision 
to engage in these compromises, however, the settlement process is more susceptible than 
adversarial adjudications to certain types of abuse. The interests oflawyer and class may 
diverge, as may the interest of different members of the class, and certain interests may be 
wrongfully compromised, betrayed, or "sold out" without drawing the attention of the 
court. For this reason, in addition to requiring that the trial court evaluate whether a class 
action settlement is "fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the product of collusion 
between the parties," the law accords special protections, primarily ,procedural in nature, 
to individual class members whose interests may be compromised 1n the settlement pro-
cess. These _protections include notice, ensurini that class members know when their 
rights are bemg compromised, and an opportumty to voice objections to the settlement. 
576 F.2d at 1169 (citation omitted). 
120. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 864 (1975); see Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973); 
Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970); Watson v. Ray, 90 F.R.D. 143, 146 (S.D. 
Iowa 1981) (court cannot assume a passive role in reviewing a class action settlement; court 
must not only fulfill its own fiduciary obligation, but also prevent class representatives from 
breaching their obligation). Other courts have also stressed that a primary function of the 
review is to protect absent class members. See Vulcan Socy. of Westchester County, Inc. v. 
Fire Dept. of City of White Plains, 505 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Foster v. Boise-
Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 679-80 (S.D. Tex. 1976), ajfd, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Rubenstein v. Republic Natl. Life Ins. Co., 74 F.R.D. 337, 347 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Seiffer v. 
Topsy's Intl., Inc., 70 F.R.D. 622, 627 (D. Kan. 1976); Boggess v. Hogan, 410 F. Supp. 433, 
437 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 64 F.R.D. 346, 347-48 (S.D. Tex. 1974); 
Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 53 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Zerkle v. Cleveland-Cliffs 
Iron Co., 52 F.R.D. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
121. Class members have an opportunity to object because of the notice requirements of 
rule 23(e). See note 117 supra and accompanying text. 
Courts consider the objections of class members as relevant, though not conclusive, in as-
sessing the fairness of the proposed settlement. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 
576 F.2d 1157, 1215 (5th Cir. 1978) (settlement reversed on appeal), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 
(1979); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 
(1976); Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108, 109 n.l (7th Cir. 1976) (The miniscule number of 
objectors, 1/5 of 1% of the class, did not reduce in magnitude the serious issues raised; settle-
ment upheld on appeal.); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 803 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1979); In 
re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 305, 317-18 (D. Md. 1979) 
(court carefully considered objections, but approved settlement); McNary v. American Sav. & 
Loan Assn., 76 F.R.D. 644, 647-48, 650-51 (N.D. Tex. 1977). 
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ness reflected in the rule. These procedures, intervention, 122 appear-
ing, 123 and subclassing, 124 allow class members to monitor and 
correct any inadequate representation by the class plaintiffs. Instead 
of opting out, the class member whose individual claim would be 
time-barred can make aggressive use of these methods. 125 To the 'ex-
tent alternatives exist, the class member who desires to opt out is in a 
much better position than other potential plaintiffs faced with a limi-
tations problem. These other potential plaintiffs are barred com-
pletely.126 The class member is only restricted from pursuing an 
independent action.127 Left with a remedy to enforce their rights, 
and with the procedural guarantees of fairness incorporated into rule 
23, class members need not opt out to protect their interests. 
Tolling, in any event, is irrelevant to the function of the opt-out 
rule. The provision merely relieves the plaintiff from the binding 
effect of the class action suit.128 This relief from res judicata does not 
122. See text at notes 102-07 supra. 
123. See text at notes 108-10 supra. 
124. See note 112 supra and accompanying text. 
125. The no-tolling rule will harm plaintiffs who have already opted out of class action 
suits. Any harm suffered because of the refusal to toll, however, is more directly caused by the 
plaintiffs failure to file on time. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text (absent a disa-
bility, a plaintiff with a large claim has no excuse for failing to file on time). The opted-out 
plaintiff is in no worse position than any other time-barred plaintiff: Both suffer as a result of a 
legislative decision to bar tardy claims. In one respect, the opted-out plaintiff merits even less 
sympathy than others who are time-barred. By making the affirmative decision to opt out, the 
plaintiff creates a statute of limitations problem where none existed before. 
126. In American Pipe, for example, the plaintiffs would have been completely barred from 
asserting their cause of action had the statute not been tolled. See American Pipe & Constr, 
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 544 (1974) (motions for intervention were held time barred by the 
district court). 
127. Denying tolling does not deprive the opt-out plaintiff of any right of action she would 
have enjoyed absent the class action; given class certification, which was denied in American 
Pipe, the plaintiff can still vindicate her interests through the class action. See note 126supra, 
128. See text at notes 8-9 supra. 
The history of rule 23 suggests that the opt-out provision was intended not to create any 
independent right, but solely to make the idea of binding absent class members by the class 
action judgment more palatable. Prior to the 1966 Amendments, under the so-called "spuri-
ous" class actions, a class member was not bound by the judgment unless she intervened in the 
action, and intervention could occur after the decision on the merits. See FED. R. C1v. P, 23 
advisory committee notes on the 1966 amendments, reprinted in, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966); 
Frankel, supra note 7, at 43-46. For a discussion of this so-called "one-way intervention," see 
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 545-47 (1974); see also Kalven & Rosen-
feld, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV, 684, 710-14 (1941); .Devel-
opments in the Law- Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV, 874, 935 
(1958). 
The argument that class members should wait until certification before deciding whether to 
file separate claims, see text at notes 91-99 supra, has been analogized to "one-way interven-
tion." One co=entator, noting the potential for "sideline sitting," stated "class members 
could await preliminary trial procedures and evaluate whether the outcome of the class action 
might be favorable. If they think it will not be favorable to them, they could opt out with the 
benefit of a tolled statute." Note, supra note 31, at 756 n.96. The 1966 Amendments sought to 
cure this defect by subjecting all class members to the judgment before the decision on the 
merits. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 547; FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on the 
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create a right to bring an individual action; it just creates the option 
to litigate independently whenever an individual action is possi-
ble.129 Tolling to extend an individual right of action goes beyond 
permitting an individual to pursue private relief, by giving class 
members more time in which to sue than they would enjoy if the 
class action had never been filed. Thus considerations of fairness do 
not support tolling the limitations period for opt-out plaintiffs. 
2) Efficiency 
Given that class members can cure defects in a certification order 
and attack inadequate settlements, 130 it seems improbable that they 
will rush to file protective motions. Less drastic alternatives than 
1966 amendments, reprinted in, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966). The basic purpose of the provi-
sion was to ensure fairness to class members, not to create independent rights. The original 
version of the rule did not include an unconditional right to opt out. Kaplan, supra note 86, at 
391 n.136 (court had discretion to deny opt-out to class members whose presence was found 
"essential to fair adjudication"). Kaplan, reporter to the Advisory Committee from 1960 to 
1966, suggests that the 23(c)(2) notice requirements, see note 7 supra and accompanying text, 
'1oins with other features of the new rule in helping to justify the ultimate extension of the 
judgment in (b)(3) cases to all members of the class, except those who requested exclusion 
from the action .... " Kaplan, supra note 86, at 392. To the extent the opt-out provision was 
inserted for vague notions of fairness, refusing to toll comports with these notions. See text at 
notes 100-27 supra. But cf. FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on the 1966 amend-
ments, reprinted in, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104-05 (1966) (23(b)(3) respects individual's interest in prose-
cuting her own action). 
The opt-out provision is not constitutionally required. The Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that "the judgment in a 'class' or 'representative' suit . . . may bind members of the class 
or those represented who were not parties to it." Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940). 
The isolated challenges to the modern rule 23 have been uniformly struck down by the courts. 
See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 75 F.R.D. 727, 735-36 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Berland v. 
Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see generally, 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, 
§ 2300a (discussion of Supreme Court due process precedent); id.§ 2475p; Developments in the 
Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1402-16. 
129. See note 128 supra; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) ("[E]ach 
class member who can be identified through reasonable effort must be notified that he may 
request exclusion from the action and thereby preserve his opportunity to press his claim sepa-
rately : ..• ") (emphasis added); 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 2475, at 157 (sample notice 
states that opting out gives plaintiff freedom to pursue whatever legal rights he or she has); 
Kaplan, supra note 86, at 391 ( one who opts out is untouched by the class action and fends for 
himself). 
130. Even if the district court approves the inadequate settlement, the dissatisfied class 
member still has several avenues of relief. First, approval of a settlement operates as a final 
judgment which class members can appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). This right to ap-
peal exists even though the class member could have opted out instead. See Ace Heating & 
Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 32 (3d Cir. 1971); see also Pettway v. American Cast 
Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1166 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (settlement overturned on appeal though 
members could have excluded themselves), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). The aggrieved 
member, however, should probably register objections at the settlement hearing if she has 
notice of the hearing. See Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059, 1060 (7th Cir. 
1970) (per curiam). 
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a second ground for relief. 
The rule allows a class member to move for relief from a final judgment because of surprise, 
excusable neglect, fraud, misrepresentation, or "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). One commentator has noted, however, 
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opting out exist to vindicate their interests. 131 The sketchy empirical 
evidence available suggests that class members simply have not 
wanted to opt out very often. 132 They opt out even less often for 
reasons related to the conduct of the class action. 133 The relative 
infrequency of opting out would seem to rebut any argument of nu-
merous protective filings. The threat of such activity seems little 
more than a trace of the problem faced in American Pipe, where the 
denial of certification left class members with no remedy unless they 
had previously filed protective motions. 
In fact, a decision to allow tolling would significantly encourage 
the waste of judicial resources, contrary to the policies behind class 
actions. The opt-out tolling decision only arises where the court al-
that very few class members have used rule 60(b), and could point to none that have suc-
ceeded. See 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 5680, at 583. 
A third avenue of relief is by collateral attack; a class member can initiate a separate suit 
on the same cause of action as the class action, and so test the validity of the class action 
judgment. See Frankel, supra note 7, at 46; FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on 
the 1966 amendments, reprinted in, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966) (res judicata effect of the class 
action judgment can only be tested in a subsequent action); see generally Note, Collateral At-
tack on the .Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 83 HARV. L. REV. 589 (1974), Attacks on 
the prior judgment will typically assert inadequate representation, see, e.g., Gonzales v. Cas-
sidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), or constitutionally defective notice of the settlement proposal, 
See, e.g., Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 636-39 (N.D. Cal. 1978), opi11/011 
adopted, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981). 
131. These less drastic alternatives - intervening, appearing, and moving for a subclass -
also promote a more efficient use of judicial resources. See text at notes 134-44 i'!fra. 
132. See, e.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (discussion of how 
few class members elect to opt out); 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 2475s ("only a small 
number of absentees normally elect to be excluded"), A study of class action cases filed in the 
District of Columbia from 1966 to 1974 provides some statistical data on the frequency of 
exclusion. The study found that in two-thirds of the cases where notice was sent, fewer than 
10% of the class members opted out. In only one case was the class size "substantially re-
duced," from 5800 members to 2300. See, Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical 
Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1150 & n.154 (1974). A further indication of the relative infre-
quency of opt-outs is in the number of reported cases on the opt-out tolling question. Though 
many class action suits are filed,see Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1311 (4th Cir. 1978); 
Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) ("class action suits, .• are 
now an ever increasing burden to so many federal courts"); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 
F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Class actions have sprouted and multiplied like the leaves of 
the green bay tree."), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Develop• 
ments in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1325 n.30 (5791 class actions pending on 
December 31, 1975; 1886 class suits filed in the first half of the fiscal year 1976), relatively few 
cases arise where opting out leads.to statutes of limitations problems. Only three cases have 
had to resolve the tolling question. See Wood v. Combustion Engr., Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 346-47 
(5th Cir. 1981); Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Cp., 485 F. Supp. 356, 360-61 (N.D. Ala. 1980); 
McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. ~ 61,359 (E.D. Mich, 
1977). 
133. See also 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 2475s (1977 & Supp. 1982). 
An indication of the extent of ignorance can be found in cases where class members were 
required to opt in. In one case, notice was sent to 114 putative class members, with instructions 
to check the appropriate box for opting in. or to remain excluded. Ninety-one returned the 
form, eighteen without checking either box. One individual checked both boxes, See Note, 
supra note 132, at 1149. 
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ready has determined the suit is maintainable as a class action. 134 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court has made a finding that "a class 
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy."135 The court, after considering 
"the interest of the members of the class in individually controlling 
the prosecution ... of separate actions,"136 and the efficiency of al-
ternative procedures, 137 has decided the class action objectives will 
be achieved.138 By opting out, the plaintiff ignores this determina-
tion. The plaintiff insists on a second trial on essentially the same 
facts and issues139 with all the inefficiencies and inconsistencies 
avoided by a class suit.140 
In American Pipe, the Court tolled the statute for intervenors to 
promote "the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a princi-
pal purpose of the [class action] procedure."141 The Court expected 
the trial to proceed "as a joint suit, or as a principal suit with addi-
tional intervenors."142 Refusing to toll for opt-out plaintiffs pro-
motes these policies. Since tolling would sanction duplicative suits, 
instead of the single trial envisioned by the Supreme Court, subse-
quent courts have refused to suspend the time bar.143 Not tolling 
134. See text at notes 7-8 supra. While a class member can file a suit at any time, she can 
only "opt out" after the class has been certified. 
135. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3). See Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1116, 
1122 n.24 (D. Hawaii 1976) (consider whether class action is the best procedure to promote 
uniformity of decision and economy of time, effort, and expense); Frankel, supra note 7, at 43 
( district court must find a class action to be the most fair, efficient, and just method to resolve 
the dispute). 
136. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3)(A). 
137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757 (3d Cir.) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). 
138. ''The rule [rule 23(b)(3)) requires the court to make a determination that the objec-
tives of the class action procedure really will be achieved in the particular case." 7 A C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1779, at 59. If the objectives cannot be achieved, then 
the class action is obviously not "superior to other available methods." See text at note 135 
supra. For a discussion of considerations specifically listed in rule 23(b )(3), see 7 A C. WRIGHT 
& A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1780; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1160. 
139. If common questions did not predominate, the class would not meet the 23(b)(3) re-
quirements. See text at note 6 supra. 
140. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1160c (interests of (b)(3) action best served by a 
single suit). Cf. 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 7, ,i 23.45[4.-2), at 23-364 (2d ed. 
1980) (discussing criteria for deciding superiority; stating that the existence of parallel lawsuits 
shows there is an actual danger of multiple litigation and conflicting results). 
141. 414 U.S. at 553. Note that the purpose of uniformity of decision was not relevant to 
the American Pipe holding. Since all the plaintiffs sought to intervene, only one decision 
would be rendered. 
142. 414 U.S. at 555. Throughout the opinion, the Court constantly restated that its deci-
sion was limited to a situation where only one suit would proceed. See 414 U.S. at 551 (class 
action filing tolls the statute of limitations for "all those who might subsequently participate in 
the suit"); 414 U.S. at 552 (class members need not exercise any responsibility "in order to 
profit from the eventual outcome of the case"). 
143. See Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1982) (American Pipe tolling is only 
for intervenors, otherwise the rule would be contrary to efficiency and economy of litigation); 
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will encourage class members to seek vindication through the class 
action suit. 144 Through methods such as intervention and appear-
ances, all the class claims can be resolved efficiently and uniformly 
in one action. Any other result would encourage tardy plaintiffs to 
splinter the class suit into a series of cases. 
To some extent, these arguments implicate the opt-out provision 
itself as well as the suspension of the time bar. The opt-out right, in 
the interest of fairness, inherently reduces judicial efficiency. But it 
does not follow that the existence of the opt-out right means that the 
overriding interest in judicial economy must yield in every instance. 
Tolling exacerbates the conflict between the opt-out provision and 
the rule's broader goals; courts that allow tolling needlessly aggra-
vate this problem 145 
The difficulty of defending the opt-out provision at all 146 argues 
against expanding the provision by tolling at the expense of class 
Gluck v. Amicor Inc., 487 F. Supp. 608, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (concern in American Pipe was 
furthering judicial efficiency and economy); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student 
Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1012 (D.D.C. 1978) (opposed to tolling for one who opts 
out because it would sanction duplicative suits), revrl. on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); cf. 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 7, 
~ 23.02[1) (class actions are increasingly used because of a need to decrease multiplicity of 
suits). 
The court in finding the (b)(3) class action superior, see notes 134-38 supra and accompa-
nying text, has decided that it is desirable to have the suit in one forum to prevent duplicative 
effort. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1779, at 60. 
144. Because the plaintiff is seeking a benefit fortuitously acquired through the class action 
procedure, it is equitable to make him or her advance the class action procedure's policies. The 
benefit is fortuitously acquired because after having neglected to file his or her own suit on 
time, the plaintiff is relying on the lucky coincidence that someone else filed a class action 
within the statutory period that included the plaintiff. The plaintiff, fortuitously included in the 
class action, now seeks the benefit of tolling. 
145. It is important to emphasize that the opt-out provision does not create an independent 
right of action, but only ensures that the bringing of a class action does not cut off whatever 
individual cause of action would otherwise exist. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying 
text. Permitting tolling would not protect the individual's independent cause of action, but 
would create an individual cause of action that would not exist absent the class suit. The 
compromise between procedural fairness and judicial economy reflected in the opt-out provi-
sion itself does not, therefore, extend to the artificial prolonging of private rights of action, for 
the refusal to toll does not deprive the plaintiff of any individual right recognized by rule 23. 
146. One commentator has noted: 
Federal courts have generally narrowly construed the self-exclusion provision of rule 23. 
Where an action can be maintained under sections (b)(l) and/or (b)(2), and also under 
section (b)(3), courts have almost invariably ruled that the suit should be brought under 
(b)(l) and/or (b)(2). See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Assn. 389 F. S-upp. 867, 
903 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
Moreover, in a number of cases where the issue was whether absentees had moved to opt 
out within the time set by the court, or, where pleading lack of notice or excusable neglect, 
the absentees filed motions for exclusion after the expiration of the opt-out period, courts 
have placed the burden of proof on the absentees, and have regularly ruled against them. 
See, e.g., In re National Student Mktg. Litig. v. Barnes Plaintiffs, 530 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1075), 
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1659 (1976); Manhattan-Ward, Inc. v. Ginnell Corp., 490 F.2d 1183, 
1185 (2d Cir. 1974) . 
.Developments in the Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1488 n.188. 
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action policies. Allowing members to opt out does not necessarily 
reduce differences of opinion within the class.147 Furthermore, those 
with divergent interests, those likely to opt out, if forced to remain in 
the action could inform the court of the possible heterogeneity 
within the class or defend the interests of absent members.148 
Moreover, the suit of one who opts out may be consolidated with the 
class action. 149 The opt-out plaintiff would end up little better than 
an intervenor, 150 but only after a considerable waste of judicial re-
sources. Finally, the right to opt out is meaningful only to the extent 
that it insulates an individual from the judgment in the class action. 
Even in a rule 23(b)(3) action, stare decisis can defeat to some de-
gree the opt-out plainti.tf s ability to bring a successful individual ac-
tion.151 In short, the practical defects of the opt-out provision render 
unwise any judicial expansion of its scope. 
Tolling the statute of limitations, then, would undermine the 
class action policies. By encouraging separate suits, it would en-
courage precisely the multiplicity of suits and waste of judicial re-
sources which the American Pipe court wanted to avoid. 
147. See id. at 1488. Several courts have held that the existence of an opt-out right under 
rule 23(c)(2) cannot be relied upon to eliminate differences within a purported class, and hence 
cannot substitute for the normal 23(a) and 23(b)(3) requirements. See, e.g., Phillips v. Klassen, 
502 F.2d 362, 367 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); Lukena v. Briyie's Mt. Resort, 
Inc., 66 F.R.D. 69, 72-73 (W.D. Va. 1975), qffd., 538 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1976); Matarazzo v. 
Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 68-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Free World Foreign Cars, 
Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); .Developments in the Law - Class 
Actions, supra note 8, at 1488. 
148. See .Developments in the Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1488. The active class 
member with divergent interests possibly represents inactive members with similar interests. 
Id. If the class is heterogeneous, subclassing would be a more efficient solution than allowing 
many separate suits. See text at note 111 supra. 
149. Rule 42(a) provides: 
When actions involving a common question oflaw or fact are :pending before the court, it 
may order a joint heanng or trial of any or all the matters in 1Ssue in the actions; it may 
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings 
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
FED. R. C1v. P 42(a). See also l H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § l 160i, at 281 (noting Illinois v. 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969), in which over 40 individual 
suits, filed after defendants successfully opposed class certification in a earlier decision, were 
consolidated for pretrial purposes under 28 U.S.C. §1407 (1976) and ultimately upheld as a 
class); C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MANUAL FOR COM-
PLEX LITIGATION §§ 5.00-5.40 (1973) (recommending that similar cases be assigned to one 
judge, even in multidistrict litigation; the judge then considers whether to consolidate the ac-
tions). 
Consolidation is possible because the opt-out plaintiff's claim has similar questions of law 
or fact to the class suit. See text at note 6 supra. 
150. See text at notes 102-07 supra. 
151. See .Developments in the Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1488. Stare decisis 
could limit the effectiveness of any later suits either through procedural rulings, such as the 
admissibility of evidence, or through interpretations of the controlling law. Other, less formal, 
influences from the class action might also affect the later separate action. The judge in the 
later case, for example, might heed the earlier rulings on the ,i;cope of discovery or the factual 
existence of an evidentiary privilege. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lack of an affirmative reason justifying tolling, and the dele-
terious effects of tolling on class action policies, mandate that courts 
refuse to toll for opt-out plaintiffs for the period during which they 
remain class members. Any contrary rule would "sanction duplica-
tive suits and violate the policies behind American Pipe." 152 Ade-
quately protected by rule 23 safeguards, the class members can 
vindicate their claims through the class suit without the need of a 
tolling rule. 
152. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 
1012 (D.D.C. 1978), revd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 
U.S. 954 (1981). 
